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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, participants at the 2015 Pacific McGeorge School of Law global
1
symposium debated the emergence of an international law of property.
Participants were inspired by Professor John G. Sprankling’s seminal work in the
field, The International Law of Property, which posited that the old view of
property as generated by and existing purely in municipal law did not reflect the
2
growing influence of international law. Throughout the day, a new crew of
International Property Law scholars delved into the depths of a number of themes
3
related to the benefits and potential drawbacks of this evolution.
Specific to the realm of ocean governance, the promise and perils of
international property law are not merely theoretical, but are advancing in
4
national regulatory bodies and international tribunals as well. There is a rich
history of ocean space regulation under international law. The law has evolved to
nationalize ocean space in order to facilitate use and conservation. But the former
has been well advanced, while the latter has lagged far behind. In this article, I
discuss the evolving governance of oceans with particular emphasis on the
threats to sustainability, increased industrialization of the oceans, and the
prospects for reforms that would address declining ecological health. I argue the
international law of property, as configured in the oceans, could initiate a
movement away from sectoral and divided ocean regulation toward more
integrative approaches that manage unique spaces drawing on scientific
information, public participation, and data sharing.
The international community is poised to adopt new governance for the High
Seas—a continuing illustration of the tragedy of the commons. The High Seas,
and beneath it “the Area,” are not controlled by any particular national
5
government, but are ocean resources open to the international community. These
areas not controlled by national governments are not lawless per se, but
governance has been least effective in these areas beyond national jurisdiction
6
(ABNJ). An international law of property could support proposed reforms that
emphasize the shared nature of ocean resources and collaborative conservation
1. Global Symposium Examined an Emerging International Law of Property, University of the Pacific
McGeorge School of Law (April 16, 2015), http://www.mcgeorge.edu/News/Global_Symposium_Examined_
an_Emerging_International_Law_of_Property.htm [hereinafter Global Symposium] (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
2. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY (2014).
3. Global Symposium, supra note 1.
4. Moira L. McConnell, Observations on the Law Applicable on the Continental Shelf and in the
Exclusive Economic Zone: A Comparative View, in 25 OCEAN YEARBOOK 221 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2011).
5. Id. at 221 (stating that the High Seas is “the water column areas outside the 200 nautical miles (NM)
from the proximate coastal state baselines, beyond any potential EEZ”).
6. Id. at 221–247. McConnell notes the growing interest in developing a legal basis for waters and
resources in the High Seas. Id. at 221.
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measures tempered by consideration for the needs of current and future
generations. With a new legal instrument addressing marine biodiversity in
ABNJ under the International Law of the Sea, the international community could
draw upon and contribute to the emerging international law of property.
II. BACKGROUND
7

The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
8
provides a comprehensive blueprint for ocean regulation. UNCLOS III was
drafted with the intent to create a legal order for the oceans by addressing all
9
issues pertaining to the seas. For that reason, UNCLOS III has been called “a
10
constitution for the oceans.” Nations that are not a party to UNCLOS III are
bound by most of its provisions through its nature as customary international
11
law. Nonetheless, UNCLOS III is not perfect, and its gaps and shortcomings
have come under increasing scrutiny as ocean systems have declined.
In creating UNCLOS III, nations recognized that the special interconnected
12
nature of the oceans required a unified approach to their management. Yet at the
time, sectoral management that addressed each particular activity with a set of
guidelines was the dominant mode of environmental regulation. Although the
majority of ocean pollution is from land-based sources, people harm oceans by
13
overfishing, through shipping activities, and from resource development. These
issues are inter-related, but the legal regimes that manage each are divided up,
14
often addressed by different organizations or agencies. UNCLOS III addresses

7. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 21 ILM 1261
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
8. DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 14 (2010).
9. Id.
10. Tommy T.B. Koh, U.N. President, A Constitution for the Oceans, Remarks at UNCLOS (Dec. 10,
1982), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
11. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 408–09 (3rd ed. 2007). “The few countries who
are not party to the LOS Convention are bound to most of the provisions through customary international law or
other treaties.” Id. On the other hand, those nations who are not a party to the UNCLOS III cannot directly
impact its development and implementation, potential benefits, or use procedures such as those designed to
delineate extended continental shelf claims. Id. at 409 (noting that treaty proponents claim national security is
promoted by participating in the treaty).
12. The UNCLOS preamble states “conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated
and need to be considered as a whole . . . .” UNCLOS, supra note 7.
13. Infra Part III.
14. For example, the International Maritime Organization addresses the shipping industry, while the FAO
addresses fisheries, in addition to various Regional Fisheries Organizations. Within the United States,
responsibility for various ocean activities is divided into NOAA Fisheries (species including some fish and
marine mammals), Regional Fisheries Management Agencies (traditional fishing and aquaculture), the Coast
Guard (security and safety), the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (regulation and oversight of offshore oil
and gas drilling operations). At the state level the variety of agencies is even more fragmented.
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ocean governance at the outset by establishing agreed boundaries of national
15
jurisdiction and lawmaking and enforcement responsibilities therein. Parties
also agreed to specific dispute mechanism provisions, including the creation of
two international bodies—the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
16
the International Seabed Authority. The ocean governance UNCLOS III
17
employs relies on property and sovereign rights.
A. Brief Primer on Ocean Jurisdiction
The Territorial Seas are recognized as the first twelve nautical miles from the
18
shore, which is also called the baseline. Nations have the greatest rights in this
area. Foreign flagged ships have the right of innocent passage through territorial
seas subject to the law of the pertinent nation, UNCLOS III, and the international
19
law on passage. Nations can also establish a Contiguous Zone of twenty-four
nautical miles from the baseline, from which they are allowed enforcement rights
20
to protect their territorial seas.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of a nation is recognized as the area
21
200 nautical miles from the shore. This area is not territorial in the same sense
as national sovereignty can be fully exercised. Indeed, the exact nature of the
EEZ is still being explored and illuminated, as UNCLOS III created it without a
direct analogue. However, according to Article 56 of UNCLOS III, nations have
22
sovereign rights to exploit the EEZ. As explained by the U.S. governmental
agency responsible for oceans management, “[t]he U.S. does not exercise
sovereignty in the contiguous zone or the EEZ. It does have exclusive sovereign
rights and jurisdiction for exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the
23
seabed, subsoil, water column, and air space in the EEZ.” Many nations,
including the U.S., U.K., Portugal, Germany, and Japan have begun extensive
exploitation of their EEZs.

15. UNCLOS, supra note 7.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at art. 3.
19. Id. at §3.
20. Id. at art. 33.
21. Id. at art. 56–57.
22. See BARBARA KWIATKOWSKA, THE 200 MILE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE NEW LAW OF THE
SEA (1989); see also Maria Gavouneli, Functional Jurisdiction in the Law of the Sea, in 62 PUBLICATIONS ON
OCEAN DEVELOPMENT (2007) (both examining the nature of the EEZ comprehensively).
23. History of the Maritime Zones under International Law, NOAA, http://www.nauticalcharts.
noaa.gov/staff/law_of_sea.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
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The Continental shelf overlaps with the EEZ in that its breadth is measured
24
as 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Nations have rights to use shelf
resources while other nations have limited rights in these zones, such as the
25
ability to lay submarine cables. Again, this represents a balance between
lawmaking by a sovereign nation and the respect for the needs of non-nationals.
Outside of these regions, the oceans are “High Seas,” also known as “areas
beyond national jurisdiction” where all nations are afforded the Freedom of the
26
27
Seas. Freedom of the High Seas means that the area is open to all nations. The
High Seas are res communis—an open access system, for purposes such as
fishing. This has led to significant impairment of resources as minimum
28
coordination or management constrains overuse.
Underlying the High Seas is the “Area,” the seabed which the International
Seabed Authority regulates in order to implement the international deep seabed
29
mining regime pursuant to section XI of UNCLOS III.
B. Dispute Resolution and International Governance
In addition to the division into zones of jurisdiction, UNCLOS III created a
30
set of mechanisms to resolve disputes: UNCLOS III created the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and contemplated dispute resolution by
31
the International Court of Justice or an arbitral tribunal. This again speaks to the
24. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 76 (noting that shelf extends 200 NM from the baselines).
25. Id. at art. 77 (rights of coastal states) and 79 (submarine cables and pipelines). It is worth noting that
placement of submarine cables cause seabed disturbances and the environmental impacts particularly on
sensitive marine habitats should be minimized.
26. Id. at Part VII.
27. Id. at art. 87.
28. The Working Group, Outcome of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues
Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond National Jurisdiction
(Jan. 20–23, 2015), http://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversityworkinggroup/documents/ahwg-9_report.pdf (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at Part XI.
30. Id. at art. 287.
31. The history of the ITLOS is explained in Hugo Caminos, The Establishment of Specialized Courts, in
CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA
33–40 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); Gritakumar E. Chitty, A Brief History of the
Post Conference Development of the Tribunal as an International Judicial Body, in CURRENT MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 41–51 (Myron H.
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); Mohamed Mouldi Marsit, The International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea and the Difficulties Encountered During the Initial Phase of its Establishment, in CURRENT MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 53–55 (Myron H.
Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); Gudmundur Eiriksson, Comments on the Origins and Purposes of
ITLOS, in CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF
THE SEA 57–60 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001); David H. Anderson, Deliberations,
Judgments, and Separate Opinions in the Practice of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, in
CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA

257

2016 / Using International Property Law as a Lever
comprehensive nature of UNCLOS III. A chamber of the tribunal, the Seabed
Disputes Chamber, deals specifically with boundary disputes between adjacent
32
nations and other seabed disputes.
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) is an international body created to
33
address mining under Part XI. The mining regime was the primary reason the
U.S. refused to join UNCLOS III, including disagreement over the creation of a
“strong” or comparatively “weak” ISA, and the treatment of the resources of the
34
Area as the “common heritage of mankind.” Despite changes to address some of
these concerns and the implementation agreement for deep seabed mining, the
35
U.S. has still failed to accede to the treaty.
Even though the U.S. has not acceded to UNCLOS III, UNCLOS III is at the
center of a robust body of international ocean governance. International
cooperation through implementation of treaty provisions at the state level,
functioning dispute resolution mechanisms contemplated by the treaty, and
arbitral decisions that rely on UNCLOS III provisions as guidance illustrate a
functional international ocean governance regime. Two recent decisions are
noteworthy for their emphasis on broad responsibilities in ocean space. The
Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS issued its first Advisory Opinion (AO)
regarding a matter ISA referred to it regarding liability for states sponsoring
36
mining in the Area. The AO asserted that all sponsoring states are held to a high
37
standard of due diligence. The Republic of Nauru initiated the inquiry because it
was interested in sponsoring a third party with the technical and financial
38
capacity to mine. The Republic of Nauru noted that if countries like itself were
39
held to the financial risks of these projects they would be functionally excluded.
The AO asserts that a state has a responsibility to ensure the sponsored
63–73 (Myron H. Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds., 2001) (explaining initial concept, negotiations, and
post-conference development and challenges faced during its initial phase of establishment).
32. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 287; see also PUBLICATIONS ON OCEAN DEVELOPMENT, MARITIME
BOUNDARY DISPUTES, SETTLEMENT PROCESSES, AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Seoung-Yong Hong & Jon M. Van
Dyke eds., 2009) (collection of essays on how nations address disputes, pragmatically and legally).
33. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at Part XI.
34. Philip A. Burr, The International Seabed Authority, 29 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 271, 274
(2006).
35. UNCLOS, supra note 7.
36. Donald K. Anton et al., Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International Seabed
Mining (ITLOS Case No. 17): International Environmental Law in the Seabed Disputes Chamber (ANU
College of Law, Working Paper No. 11-06 (March 23, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1793216 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing historic nature of
AO on four different levels); Anna Dolidze, Advisory Opinion on Responsibility and Liability for International
Seabed Mining (ITLOS Case No. 17) and the Future of NGO Participation in the International Legal Process,
19 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 380 (2013) (discussing role of NGOs in ITLOS advisory opinion).
37. Responsibilities and obligations of States with respect to activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory
Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 2011, 34–35.
38. Id. at 6–8.
39. Id. at 8.
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40

contractor’s compliance to some degree. The AO contributes to the
development of international environmental law by confirming state liability for
failing to ensure compliance by the sponsored contractor, although falling short
41
of a strict liability scheme.
Secondly, ITLOS issued an AO in April 2015 relating to illegal, unreported,
42
and unregulated fishing (IUU). The tribunal emphasized that under the
convention, nations must have due regard for the rights and duties of other
43
nations. Paragraph 216 noted the following:
While the SRFC Member States and other States Parties to the
Convention have sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and
manage the living resources in their exclusive economic zones, in
exercising their rights and performing their duties under the Convention
in their respective exclusive economic zones, they must have due regard
44
to the rights and duties of one another.
What are the responsibilities and liabilities of a nation for vessels flagged in
that state, for IUU occurring in third party EEZ? The AO notes that flag state
responsibility is that of due diligence:
The liability of the flag State does not arise from a failure of vessels
flying its flag to comply with the laws and regulations of the SRFC
Member States concerning IUU fishing activities in their exclusive
economic zones, as the violation of such laws and regulations by vessels
45
is not per se attributable to the flag State.
Flag State liability arises from its failure to comply with its “due diligence”
obligations concerning IUU fishing activities conducted by vessels flying its flag
46
in the exclusive economic zones of the SRFC Member States.
C. The Power of Property
Discussions of property evoke different norms and preconceptions. Because,
as Professor Sprankling acknowledges, municipal laws have long defined
property as a matter of sovereignty, property thus arises from different legal
40. Id. at 34–45.
41. Anton et al., supra note 36, at 5.
42. Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SFRC v.
Ger.), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015.
43. Id. at ¶ 210.
44. Id. at ¶ 216.
45. Id. at 61.
46. Id.
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47

histories and cultural backgrounds. Panelists during the symposium noted that
property doctrine and property theory can, at times, be so far apart as to render
property an unworkable tool.
First, those wary of property rights fear the Blackstonian view of property
vesting absolute authority in the person asserting the right. Although this view
does not hold universal sway in practice, it is nonetheless influential. The desire
to respect property rights often obstructs public efforts to change patterns of
resource use. Property is conceptualized as a bundle of rights consisting of the
48
right to exclude, right to use, right to transfer, and even the right to destroy. The
responsibilities side of property has not taken hold in the same ways as the rights
side. For example, as nations expanded their territorial claims in the oceans,
management regimes that exploit resources without concomitant resource
conservation measures have been commonplace. As scholars have noted:
Many coastal nations have adopted domestic laws that assert expanded
rights and jurisdiction in their offshore seas. Only rarely, however, do
these domestic laws expressly recognize the duties, such as the duties to
conserve and optimally utilize living resources, that current international
49
law supposedly imposes on them.
For this reason, as I will return to later in this essay, scholars have
emphasized the need to address the fiduciary responsibilities of nations that
50
regulate authority over ocean space. As one foundational property case in the
U.S. emphasized, “[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to
51
that end, and are limited by it.” This illustrates the reality that property rights
are inherently shaped by a corresponding need to accommodate the rights of
others. Ocean governance provides a useful example proving this point.
D. Ocean Governance Support for an International Property Law Thesis
The UNCLOS III territorial regime supports Professor Sprankling’s assertion
52
that an International Law of Property has emerged. Nations have agreed to
divide ocean space for the purpose of exploitation as well as conservation. This is
the purpose of property as a tool—to allocate scarce resources and to facilitate
the orderly use of resources by identifying clearly the actors who hold rights of

47. SPRANKLING, supra note 2.
48. JOHN G. SPRANKLING & RAYMOND R. COLETTA, PROPERTY: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 25–93
(2d ed. 2012).
49. KALO ET AL., supra note 11, at 408.
50. See infra Part V.A.
51. State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1971).
52. SPRANKLING, supra note 2.
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use—and thus must be involved in transactions relating to physically existing
assets of the marine environment. Moreover, creation of the ISA—an
international body with supranational authority that vests title to minerals in
contracting parties sponsored by individual nations—strongly supports the thesis
53
of an existing international law of property. In the case of seabed minerals,
property rights are created without reference to a body of national law or national
sovereignty over the space. The Area is international, it is shared, and its
54
resources are the “common heritage of mankind.” This strong reference point
proves Professor Sprankling’s thesis regarding the development of an
international property law. The recent AO of ITLOS again emphasizes the
concept that even when exercising their rights, nations must exercise due regard
55
for the rights of others.
It is important to note however, that the division into boundaries by reference
to nautical miles does not take into account environmental assets, nor does
division of the water column and seabed into separate management regimes
56
support comprehensive environmental management. These are a handful of the
shortcomings of UNCLOS III. Compounding the problem is the slow progress of
national implementation of responsibilities to conserve marine resources in
UNCLOS III and other treaties. The next sections of this essay provides an
examination of the current state of ocean health and ocean governance to support
the argument that the international community should act in concert to mend
existing agreements to strengthen environmental protection in the oceans.
III. STATE OF OCEAN HEALTH
The health of ocean systems is declining. This section describes some of the
most pressing environmental issues in the ocean environment and the most direct
international environmental laws that address these challenges. First, the section
discusses overfishing, climate change, and pollution. Next, this section discusses
emerging environmental impacts from industrialization and place-based
activities—aquaculture, oil and gas exploration, mining, and ocean renewable
energy—whose environmental regulation is just emerging. The most at-risk
region due to lack of governance is the High Seas, where important fisheries and
marine species spend time or migrate though areas that lack protection of
national laws. Technology improvements have also allowed oil, gas, and
minerals exploration and extraction in deep waters where scant research and
53. The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTH., http://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code/Regulations (last visited
Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
54. Supra text accompanying notes 26–29.
55. Supra text accompanying notes 40–44.
56. Robin Warner, PROTECTING THE OCEANS BEYOND NATIONAL JURISDICTION: STRENGTHENING THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORK 64 (2009).
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scientific data on the environment is available to use in assessing and crafting
sustainable development frameworks. Even in the unforgiving Arctic
environment, oil and gas companies are jostling to explore untapped fossil fuel
resources.
A. Overfishing
57

For the past several decades, commercial fishing has led to severe declines.
With the advent of technology such as radar, there was literally nowhere for fish
58
to hide from commercial fishery operations. Industrial operations that process
59
fish at sea to serve markets quickly also accelerated the decline. Nearly eighty
60
percent of commercial fisheries are overfished. The continued extraction of fish
at unsustainable levels has created a cascade effect that impacts fish, habitat, and
61
other marine animals. When a popular fish disappears from the oceans,
62
fishermen begin to harvest less popular varieties. As commercial fishermen
“fish down the food chain,” even previously unimpaired fisheries have begun to
63
exhibit declines from industrialized fishing operations. Bycatch of non-target
64
species is also common. A related synergistic impact is the relationship of fewer
fish within the environment and the negative consequences to the inter-related
65
ecosystem.
UNCLOS III endorsed nationalizing EEZs and placing responsibilities for
fishery conservation in the ambit of state control, which might be assumed to
result in more effective conservation of fisheries. Instead, many nations restricted
fishing by foreign fleets, but allowed nationals to overfish and continue the use of
destructive fishing practices such as trawling. The parties revisited this issue in
66
1995 with the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement. This agreement seeks to conserve
highly migratory fish and stocks that straddle the boundaries of one or more
EEZs and the High Seas. Nations have also entered into regional fishing

57. Mercedez Lee & Carl Safina, The Effects of Overfishing on Marine Biodiversity, 13 J. MARINE EDUC.
5, 5–9, (1995).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Bycatch means discarded fish or other marine resources, and includes marine deaths “due to a
direct encounter with fishing gear.” What is Bycatch?, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/by_catch/
bycatch_whatis.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). Bycatch
can have severe negative effects on the ocean ecosystem. Id.
65. Id.
66. U.N. Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
164/37 (Aug. 4, 1995).

262

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
agreements. Although parties need to implement these measures and focus on
more effective enforcement, the law is in place to address fishing with an
approach that recognizes collaborative efforts must be used to address the
interests of multiple nations.
B. Climate Change
Climate change or climate disruption is a mounting challenge for ocean
67
management. The emission of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere has caused
disruption to previously experienced predictable weather patterns. This has
caused higher temperatures and melting ice in polar regions among other
68
impacts. As seas expand, we will see the impact on coastlines with sea level
69
rise. The addition of carbon dioxide, one of the greenhouse gases, reduces pH
70
levels in oceans and causes an effect known as ocean acidification. This change
in pH bleaches corals and impacts the ability of calcium carbonate to form, which
is needed by many base-level creatures that compose the bottom in the pyramid
71
of food resources. For this reason, coral reef habitats, and thus the life
72
depending on the reefs, are severely impacted.
Further, the U.S. government has emphasized that these changes could put
the entire ocean food web at risk. Ocean acidification can impact the behavior of
73
fish, perhaps increasing predation. Marine mammals have been impacted as
74
warmer waters change patterns of predation. For example, waters off the shore
of California have been warmer in the past year, and thus some fish have stayed

67. RANDALL ABATE & ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS ON OCEAN AND COASTAL
LAW: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 2 (2015).
68. THOMAS F. STOCKER ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE 2013, THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING
GROUP 1 CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, V (2013); POTSDAM INST. FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RES. AND CLIMATE ANALYTICS, TURN
DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE, XVII (2013)
[hereinafter TURN DOWN THE HEAT].
69. See TURN DOWN THE HEAT, supra note 68, at 14–16 (discussing sea level rise).
70. What is Ocean Acidification?, NOAA, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/acidification.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
71. Id.
72. TURN DOWN THE HEAT, supra note 68, at 90 (noting vulnerable populations that depend on fisheries
that will be impacted by destruction of coral reef habitats).
73. “Decreases in carbonate ions can make building and maintaining shells and other calcium carbonate
structures difficult for calcifying organisms such as oysters, clams, sea urchins, shallow water corals, deep sea
corals, and calcareous plankton. These changes in ocean chemistry can affect the behavior of non-calcifying
organisms as well. Certain fish’s ability to detect predators is decreased in more acidic waters. When these
organisms are at risk, the entire food web may also be at risk.” Id.
74. Record Number of Stranded Sea Lion Pups Strains California Resources, NPR (Mar. 20, 2015)
http://www.npr.org/2015/03/20/394242378/record-number-of-starved-sea-lion-pups-straining-calif-resources
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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75

further offshore. NOAA scientists and others studying the record number of
stranded sea lion pups have come to the consensus that mothers have had to
76
travel further to get fish for their pups. Pups have been found starving and
77
emaciated, with some trying to hunt on their own. These can be seen as cascade
effects of climate change and overfishing throughout the interrelated marine
ecosystem. Fewer fish that are located further offshore impacts reproduction of
78
mammals that need land-based rearing grounds.
79
The legal regime to address climate change is scattered. To date, nations
have not fully employed international frameworks to curtail the emissions that
cause climate change. Although the U.S. and many other nations joined the U.N.
Framework on Climate Change, progress to implement effective greenhouse gas
80
controls has been elusive. Many see the Paris climate negotiations as the last
possible opportunity for the international community to achieve a two-degree
warming scenario, which the IPCC promoted as the outer-limit of warming to
81
avoid catastrophic consequences.
C. Pollution
1. Traditional Pollution
Traditional chemical pollution from vessel discharges and other industrial
activities continues to impair ocean waters. The International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the London Dumping
82
Convention are international treaties that regulate these types of pollution.
Although to date undeveloped, UNCLOS III also directs states to adopt laws and

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. (mentioning that many of the sea lions off of California’s coast are born on Southern California’s
Channel Islands).
79. RICHARD G. HIDRETH, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE LAW MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION, VI (2009)
(noting that “climate change law is a new synthesis of several fields”).
80. Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
81. Paris Climate Change Conference–November 2015, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
82. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution By Dumping Of Wastes And Other Materials, Dec.
29, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 2403, 1046 U.N.T.S 120 [hereinafter London Dumping Convention]; Protocol of 1978
Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978 [hereinafter
MARPOL].
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regulations preventing, reducing, and controlling pollution from dumping and
83
from vessels.
MARPOL addresses pollution from vessel incidents at sea and restricts ships
84
from emptying waste into the oceans. However, this has not prevented a
significant amount of waste and oily barge water from entering the oceans and
has led commentators to note that MARPOL regulation is too lenient. The
International Maritime Organization is the competent organization that addresses
shipping issues, including employment, liability for safety, and seaworthiness of
85
vessels. The London Dumping Convention prohibits the placement of matter in
86
87
the oceans to prevent the ocean from becoming a convenient dumping ground.
2. Special Growing Plastic Pollution Problem
The foregoing laws are insufficient to stem the tide of waste entering our
oceans. A growing accumulation of plastic garbage in the oceans is now
engaging scientists and policymakers. An area twice the size of the state of Texas
88
swirls with murky refuse. This is known as the garbage patch or “vortex”
Pacific gyre. Here, small pieces of plastic accumulate based on movement of sea
89
conditions. Incredibly troubling is how marine life mistakes the colorful
garbage for food. An accumulation of garbage in creatures’ stomachs can starve
marine life. Furthermore, the plastic garbage is leaching chemicals into the water
and into sea creatures that consume it.
D. Industrialization
A picture of the pressures facing oceans wouldn’t be complete without
highlighting the continued development of ocean resources. First, there is new
interest in marine renewable energy sources—using devices to capture energy
from offshore wind, wave and tidal energy, and ocean thermal energy conversion
90
(OTEC). Second, another development is open ocean aquaculture where sea91
farmers would rear fish for consumption in large pens offshore. Third,
83. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 210 (pollution from dumping) and art. 211 (pollution from vessels).
84. MARPOL, supra note 82.
85. Introduction to IMO, International Maritime Organization, http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/
Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
86. London Dumping Convention, supra note 82.
87. Id.
88. How Big is the “Great Pacific Garbage Patch?” Science v. Myth, NOAA OFF. OF RESPONSE AND
RESTORATION (Feb. 7, 2013), http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/how-big-great-pacific-garbagepatch-science-vs-myth.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
89. Id.
90. Infra Part III.2.D.1.
91. Infra Part III.2.D.2.
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continued interest in offshore oil drilling, with the additional pressure to extract
Artic oil and gas, is predicted to constitute some one-fifth of the existing reserves
92
93
on earth. Finally, activity in offshore mining is increasing. Deep seabed mining
is actually emerging after long being hypothesized as on the horizon. According
94
to one source, ISA has issued twenty-six contracts. Unfortunately, laws have not
kept pace with these developments.
1. Marine Renewable Energy
Perhaps at no other time has the pressure to develop new sources of
renewable energy been greater. Marine renewable energy may have the least
environmental impacts and will help us transition from carbon-based energy
95
sources. But since energy demand is onshore, whereas the production will take
place far offshore, all of these forms of energy generation will require submarine
cables to bring the generated energy to shore for human use. Thus, the
destruction of some seabed will occur, as well as disturbances—from
construction of submarine cable highways—that include noise and physical
disturbance in the immediate vicinity.
Some of the other impacts from marine renewable energy are common. Each
of the forms of renewable energy production offshore will involve physical
disturbance and noise from construction. Ill-sited devices may cause impacts to
migratory pathways no matter the form of energy generation as they result in the
introduction of large objects used in the process of energy generation. The
artificial reef impact suggests that some devices may aggregate fish that are
associators. Marine life, such as barnacles, may attach itself to the devices and
over time, that biomass could impact the integrity of the structure. The offshore
oil and gas industry have used toxic chemicals like biocides to prevent
degradation of the integrity of devices. If used with marine renewable devices,
these toxic chemicals could enter the marine environment and cause harm.
Wind energy offshore has been developed in a number of nations and
96
therefore, research on environmental impacts is more robust. Beyond the
construction impacts, these structures act as artificial reefs and create acoustic

92. Infra Part III.2.D.3.
93. Infra Part III.2.D.4.
94. Managing Mining of the Seabed, PHYS.ORG (July 9, 2915), http://phys.org/news/2015-07-deepseabed.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
95. Jeff Thayler & Patrick Lyons, The Seas are Changing, It’s Time to Use Ocean-Based Renewable
Energy, the Public Trust, and a Green Thumb to Protect Our Seas From Climate Change, 19 OCEAN AND
COASTAL L.J. 241 (2014).
96. A. BRITO-MELO ET AL., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY IMPLEMENTING
AGREEMENT ON OCEAN ENERGY SYSTEMS 62 (2009). Particularly in near-shore areas, wind energy has
expanded for example in the U.K. and in Belgium. Id.
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impacts, and windmills have been scrutinized for their effects on avian wildlife
97
as blades impact migrating and marine birds. Tidal energy devices are similar to
windmill turbines, but placed in the water to capture movement during the very
98
predictable tides. The technology is well-developed and has been proven to
have minimal impacts on the environment. Yet, the acoustic impacts are also
noteworthy and of concern for sensitive marine life.
Wave energy conversion devices and OTEC are less developed technologies.
Wave energy devices convert energy into electricity through various
99
technologies, such as fixed buoys attached to the seafloor, wave attenuators that
are moved by the motion of waves, and overtopping devices that draw water
100
down through the devices to move turbines. Regardless of their conversion
mechanism, all types of technologies will generate impacts during the
construction phase. OTEC is premised on capturing energy created by the
101
existence of different water temperatures at varying depths. Conversion of
thermal gradient energy will require structures that are place-based and have
similar impacts to other marine based renewable energy devices.
UNCLOS III Article 208 addresses pollution from seabed activities and
requires nations to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control
102
pollution in their jurisdictions. Article 208 cross-references articles 60 and 80,
which make it clear that generation of energy by, for example, wave and wind
103
energy devices attached to the seabed, are contemplated by this provision. To
some, the attempt to adapt the UNCLOS III provisions to the new technologies of
marine renewables is ill-advised and a new regime to manage expedited marine
104
renewables development should be introduced.

97. Offshore Wind Farms Benefit Sealife, Says Study, EWEA BLOG (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.ewea.
org/blog/2012/12/offshore-wind-farms-benefit-sealife-says-study/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
98. Tidal Devices, EUR. MARINE ENERGY CTR., http://www.emec.org.uk/marine-energy/tidal-devices/
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
99. Wave Devices, EUR. MARINE ENERGY CTR., http://www.emec.org.uk/marine-energy/wave-devices/
(last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
100. Id.
101. Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Basics, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY,
http://energy.gov/eere/energybasics/articles/ocean-thermal-energy-conversion-basics (last visited Jan. 29, 2016)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
102. The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in 1973 and met for several months
a year through 1982, when the Conference adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982. See UNCLOS supra note 17, at art. 208.
103. UNCLOS, supra note 17, at art. 208.
104. Francesca Galea, A Legal Regime for the Exploration and Exploitation of Offshore Renewable
Energy, 25 OCEAN YEARBOOK 101–129 (2011).
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2. Aquaculture
Demand for seafood has increased, while at the same time, many commercial
fisheries are in declining yield. Aquaculture has been proposed as a means to
address this shortfall in quantity. Aquaculture is the process of rearing fish in
105
large ocean pens. Waste can accumulate from the rearing of so many fish in
one location. Thus, many jurisdictions have strictly regulated aquaculture nearshore, which has driven some companies to seek locations farther offshore in the
EEZ. An additional concern is the spread of disease among fish in the confined
aquaculture system. Whether this practice can be conducted sustainably is the
subject of dispute. Another aspect is the feeding habits of the fish reared. If the
fish themselves eat other fish, then the amount of protein needed to support the
aquaculture activities may be more than the amount of protein yielded. Profitmaking enterprises assert that low-grade and inexpensive sources of protein
generate high-value sources of protein; however, the inputs must be scrutinized
in order to support the practice as a means to feed a growing global population,
not just profit and tonnage of fish outputs.
3. Offshore Oil and Gas
106

Oil and gas development near-shore began over a century ago. Over the
past few decades the industry developed technology to explore for and extract oil
107
and gas in increasingly deep waters. The Macondo well explosion in the Gulf
of Mexico forever impacted the history of deep-water drilling and demonstrated
that the industry had yet to develop adequate response capacity for the scope of
108
the disaster that ensued. As a result, some commentators assert that an
international global regime should be adopted to compensate for the insufficiency
109
of domestic laws to regulate the offshore industry. To date, no such
international law comprehensively regulates offshore oil and gas operations.
UNCLOS III Article 208 addresses pollution from seabed activities and requires
nations to adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution in
110
their jurisdictions. The Arctic is the newest frontier for fossil fuels exploration,
105. What is Aquaculture?, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aquaculture/what_is_
aquaculture.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
106. Offshore Drilling: History and Overview, OFFSHORE ENERGY TODAY (June 25, 2010), http://www.
offshoreenergytoday.com/offshore-drilling-history-and-overview/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
107. ABATE & CRAIG, supra note 67, at 160–61.
108. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011).
109. Naama Hasson, Deepwater Offshore Oil Exploration Regulation: The Need for a Global
Environmental Regulation Regime, 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T. 277 (2013).
110. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 208.
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although no projects are anticipated in the U.S. territory for the foreseeable
future.
4. Deep Seabed Mining
We have little experience with mining offshore to date, but significant
111
momentum to expand mining is gathering. One example of offshore mining is
diamond mining from Namibia. Gravel is also mined in various offshore
locations. Our lack of information about deep seabed environments compounds
the issues. The type of deposits a company extracts drives the impacts from
seabed mining. The ISA has adopted regulations in a “mining code” for
112
polymetallic nodules, ferromanganese crusts, and polymetallic sulfides.
Polymetallic nodules are potato-shaped rocks found at depths of 9,000 to
113
18,000 feet that contain copper, cobalt, manganese, and nickel. Polymetallic
sulfide deposits, formed by deep-water vents contain silver, gold, copper,
114
manganese, cobalt, zinc, and lead.
In addition to the many contracts the ISA has issued, the company Nautilus
115
Minerals Inc. has obtained a concession to mine offshore Papua New Guinea.
This project will help to demonstrate the viability of these mining projects.
In conclusion, significant work is needed to improve the state of ocean
116
health. The stressors on ocean health are transboundary. Thus, none of the
stressors can be adequately addressed by one nation alone—a concerted effort of
the international community will be required. There is some promise in the fact
that issues involving conservation and the gaps in international regulation have
reached international tribunals, organizations, and working groups and has
generally entered into mainstream discussions focused on future solutions. One
scholar noted “there will be more and more problems and disputes concerning the
conservation and exploitation of the living resources of the sea and the protection
117
of the environment.” We must seize these disputes as an opportunity to expand
protection of environmental resources, moving more in the direction of

111. Alistair MacDonald & Edward Welsch, Next Frontier: Mining the Ocean Floor, WALL ST. J. (June
4, 2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303395604577434660065784388 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
112. The Mining Code, supra note 53.
113. INT’L SEABED AUTH., POLYMETALLIC NODULES 1–2, available at https://www.isa.org.jm/files/
documents/EN/Brochures/ENG7.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Those stressors discussed include pollution, overfishing and climate change.
117. BUDISLAV VUKAS, MAIN FEATURES OF COURTS AND TRIBUNALS DEALING WITH LAW OF THE SEA
CASES, IN CURRENT MARINE ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF
THE SEA 217 (2001).
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integrative regulation and away from the responsive, sector-by-sector regulation
that has thus far failed to protect the oceans from severe harms.
IV. BROADER ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
As the prior section illustrates, ocean regulation has followed a sectorial
management approach. Individual activities spurred adoption of laws specific to
regulating the activity. Beyond these sectoral laws, there are an abundance of
international environmental laws that influence environmental protection
offshore. As one expert has explained, however, the regime of environmental
protection suffers from a lack of implementation of these responsibilities in the
domestic context and a failure to unify protection of the seabed with the water
column itself and the living marine resources that depend on a healthy
118
environment.
First, UNCLOS III contains requirements for protecting the environment in
119
Part XII. Article 192 establishes a fundamental duty of parties to protect and
120
preserve the environment. It can be perceived that this duty is elevated above
the sovereign right of states to exploit their natural resources because Article 193
provides that the right must be exercised by states “in accordance with their duty
121
to protect and preserve the marine environment.” Article 194(1) says that states
shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures necessary to
prevent, reduce and, control pollution of the marine environment from any
122
source.
In their treatise on the International Law of the Sea, authors Donald Rothwell
and Tim Stephens explain the interplay among various international sources to
123
support an environmental ethic of transboundry obligations in the oceans. As
they note, UNCLOS III 194(2) provides that states are to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to other states or their
environment. States also must ensure that pollution does not spread beyond the
124
areas where they exercise sovereign rights, which is built upon the Trail
Smelter case. In that case, a smelter in British Columbia created pollution that
drifted into the neighboring U.S. and damaged natural resources and property in

118. See generally WARNER, supra note 56, at 39–79 (describing the author’s explanation regarding the
lack of implementation of environmental protections).
119. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at Part XII.
120. Id. at art. 192.
121. Id. at art. 193.
122. Id. at art. 194(1).
123. ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 324-43.
124. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at 478. The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in
1973 and met for several months a year through 1982, when the Conference adopted the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
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the state of Washington. The U.S. and Canada agreed to resolve the dispute and
125
submitted itself to the tribunal for a binding resolution. The tribunal held that a
nation cannot knowingly permit use of its territory to cause serious injury by
pollution in the territory of another state “when the case is of serious
126
consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.”
Further, the obligation is an incorporation of responsibility referred to in the 1972
Stockholm Declaration and 1992 Rio Declaration to prevent damage to the
127
environment of areas beyond national jurisdiction. Most, if not all, international
environmental lawyers would contend that the 1972 Stockholm Declaration is
128
customary international law.
Moreover, with the addition of the Rio
Declaration, these declarations form the basis for an ethic of environmental
protection and are the bedrock to international environmental law.
Biodiversity, of seas and otherwise, is promoted through the Convention on
129
Biological Diversity (CBD). This convention promotes the equitable sharing of
benefits from genetic resources, specifically the growing interest in
bioprospecting. Indeed, the CBD cites verbatim the 1972 Stockholm
130
Declaration. As nearly all nations have adopted the CBD—except three,
including the U.S.—it is important to respect its binding nature on parties and
likely ascendency to customary international law.
Additional treaties could be drawn upon to protect marine wildlife. Using
trade as its means of impact, the Convention on the International Trade in
131
Endangered Species protects a number of threatened marine species. For
example, all sea turtles are facing the threat of extinction and thus their harvest
and trade is prohibited by the Convention on the International Trade in
132
Endangered Species. The International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling has curtailed overharvesting of whales, although some whaling
133
This Convention has been instrumental in rebuilding whale
continues.
populations.
At best, these different laws represent a patchwork of protection, which has
failed to keep pace with the advancing utilization of ocean living and non-living
resources. In addition to proactive measures, the global community has yet to
125. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.J.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Apr. 13, 1938).
126. Id.
127. ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 8, at 343 (discussing interplay of UNCLOS III art. 194, Trial
Smelter Case and 1992 Rio Declarations).
128. DONALD K. ANTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS,
PROBLEMS 60 (2007).
129. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79
130. ANTON ET AL., supra note 128, at 60.
131. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Apr. 30, 1983,
993 UNTS 243.
132. Id.
133. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 UNTS 72.
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settle on the means to address damage caused to the global commons or swift
means to address transboundary harms. As one scholar noted, “principles of
liability and compensation in cases of transboundary damage are not well
developed and the State practice and treaty formulations at the global level
134
continue to show variation and disparity in content.”
V. GROWING SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATIVE SOLUTIONS
There is growing international interest to address the threats to ocean
sustainability. The Rio Declaration and Brundtland Report, “Our Common
Future,” recognized the promise of sustainable development that put
environmental conservation at the forefront of consideration during
135
development. Spurred significantly by public interest groups and reaching into
the commercial interests that wish to continue to profit from abundant ocean
resources, change is afoot. Robin Warner, in her seminal book on sustainable
development, tracks how human impacts on the marine environment must be
136
curtailed by filling gaps in international law.
A. Ocean Public Trust
Under the concept of the public trust doctrine, the oceans are held in trust as
137
assets by governments for current and future generations of citizens. It is
proposed as a limit on resource consumption, overuse, and overexploitation.
Advocates draw on the public trust concept to limit total industrialization and
form a foundation for limits on fishing, shipping, and energy development that
has cumulatively overwhelmed ocean systems’ carrying capacity. Scholars
acknowledge potential resistance to applying the doctrine. As Stephen Roady
notes, “it is controversial because it has the potential to pit the public interest in
access to certain lands and waters against property owners asserting a competing
138
interest.”

134. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, International Liability for Transboundary Harm, 34 ENVTL. POL’Y L.
224 (2004).
135. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: “Our
Common Future,” U.N. Doc A/47/427 (Aug. 4, 1987).
136. WARNER, supra note 56.
137. Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance, Understanding Property Rights and the
Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 335 (2006) (arguing that government holds seabed, water column,
and ocean resources in trust for the public). Her contention rests on the argument that nations do not hold
sovereignty in the EEZ, and thus their exercise over ocean resources is that of imperium (authority, regulatory
jurisdiction), not dominion (ownership). Id. at 334.
138. Stephen E. Roady, The Public Trust Doctrine, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 39, 39
(ABA ed., 2007)
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What is the history of the public trust doctrine? Its origins are in the Roman
139
Institutes of Justinian, which likely borrowed the idea from the Greeks. The
140
concept was then incorporated into England’s common law. The U.S. inherited
141
the concept from the English crown. Each U.S. state has a version applicable to
submerged and tidelands and often water—even groundwater in California—
which has one of the broadest conceptions of the public trust doctrine of any U.S.
state. Critics challenge its application to the Federal government in the U.S., but
a large number of scholars advocate its use in relation to conserving ocean
142
resources under federal control.
Scholars such as Professor Peter Sand have argued cogently that the public
trust doctrine should be extended internationally to common pool resources. Sand
explains that because it has common law history, it has no exact parallel in civil
law systems, yet he persuasively argues it could be used for the conservation of
143
oceans. He notes that the EEZ and additional international obligations make
144
clear that a nation’s use of the resources is “not proprietary, but fiduciary.”
B. Marine Spatial Planning
As documented in this paper, both traditional and new uses of oceans have
intensified environmental degradation. As one expert on ocean energy systems
perceived, “[i]nstead of some usages replacing others, it is likely that traditional
usages of ocean space [will] continue or even increase, while new and competing
145
uses will equally require large areas.” It will then be necessary to find means to
facilitate this development in a way that avoids conflicts among users while also
preventing decline of marine ecosystems.
Marine Spatial Planning (MSP) is similar to ocean zoning, but with
146
sensitivity to the environment. MSP draws on zoning concepts where particular
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Rachael E. Salcido, The Law Applicable on the Outer Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive
Economic Zone, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 407 (2010).
143. Peter H. Sand, Sovereignty Bounded, Public Trusteeship for Common Pool Resources, 4 GLOB. ENV.
POL. 47-48 (2004); see also Peter H. Sand, Public Trusteeship for the Ocean, in LAW OF THE SEA,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 521, 522 (Tafsir M. Ndiaye & Rudiger Wolfrum, eds.
2007).
144. Sand, supra note 143, at 48.
145. Frank Neumann, Ocean Energy As Ocean Space Use Only Conflict or Also Synergies?, in OCEAN
ENERGY SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT ANNUAL REPORT 41 (Dr. J. Huckerby and Dr. A. Brito e
Melo eds. 2009).
146. See CHARLES EHLER & FANNY DOUVERE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL OCEANOGRAPHIC COMM’N,
MARINE SPATIAL PLANNING: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TOWARD ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT 24
(2009), available at http://www.unesco-ioc-marinesp.be/uploads/documentenbank/d87c0c421da4593fd93bbee1
898e1d51.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that MSP is ecosystem-based).
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locations are identified for specific uses and potentially impactful uses are
147
limited, outlawed, or designated for specific places to reduce harm. “[MSP] is a
public process of analyzing and allocating the spatial and temporal distribution of
human activities in marine areas to achieve ecological, economic, and social
148
objectives that are usually specified through a political process.”
MSP is employed in different countries to different degrees—one of the best
149
examples is Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. The concept is also used to manage
150
resources in Belgium and Germany. It is used extensively in the U.S. by coastal
states such as California, Oregon, and Rhode Island. One challenge of MSP in
international waters is confronting the boundaries of multiple nations, many of
151
which do not respect ecological boundaries. Indeed, experts have emphasized
that the success of the Australian Great Barrier Reef is related to the fact that it is
a large marine ecosystem that is within the national jurisdiction of a single
152
nation. In the case of the High Seas, the lack of clear authority to designate uses
or prohibited activities has also been seen as a challenge for which various
153
international authorities must be employed to facilitate MSP.
An important aspect of this tool is the subcategory of Marine Protected Areas
154
that are “no take” zones where restoration of marine living resources can occur.
Scholars have suggested closing the High Seas as a means of increasing the
155
possible fishing success in nearby areas under national jurisdiction. This would
156
be of particular importance to migratory fish such as tuna, billfish, and sharks.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. Robin Craig, Ocean Governance for the 21st Century: Making Marine Zoning Climate Change
Adaptable, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 305 (2012).
150. 2011 25 Ocean Y.B. 1
151. Frank Maes, The International Legal Framework for Marine Spatial Planning, 32 MARINE POLICY
797, 798 (2008).
152. Id.
153. Jeff Ardron, et al., Marine Spatial Planning in the High Seas, 32 MARINE POLICY 832–39 (2008).
154. EHLER & DOUVERE, supra note 146, at 23.
155. White et al., Close the High Seas to Fishing?, PLOS BIOLOGY 3 (2014).
The world’s oceans are governed as a system of over 150 sovereign exclusive economic
zones (EEZs, [approximately forty-two percent] of the ocean) and one large high seas
(HS) commons ([approximately fifty-eight percent] of ocean) with essentially open
access. Many high-valued fish species such as tuna, billfish, and shark migrate around
these large oceanic regions, which as a consequence of competition across EEZs and a
global race-to-fish on the HS, have been over-exploited and now return far less than their
economic potential. We address this global challenge by analyzing with a spatial
bioeconomic model the effects of completely closing the HS to fishing. This policy both
induces cooperation among countries in the exploitation of migratory stocks and provides
a refuge sufficiently large to recover and maintain these stocks at levels close to those
that would maximize fisheries returns. We find that completely closing the HS to fishing
would simultaneously give rise to large gains in fisheries profit ([more than 100
percent]), fisheries yields ([more than thirty percent]), and fish stock conservation ([more
than 150 percent]). We also find that changing EEZ size may benefit some fisheries;
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C. Environmental Impact Assessment
The United States adopted the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in
157
1970. NEPA’s foundational principle is that federal agencies must make an
158
assessment of the environmental impacts of their proposed actions. Although
federal law does not require that agencies take the most environmentally benign
course of action identified during the environmental impact assessment process,
the process requires an analysis of the alternatives, including a no-action
alternative, and cumulative impacts. Proposals often benefit by the incorporation
of mitigation provisions and adjustments to reduce environmental impacts that
may have evaded identification without the process.
This concept of environmental assessment has been exported to many nations
159
and now exists at the international level as well. The Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment (TEIA) was adopted by the United Nations
160
Economic Commission for Europe, known as the ESPOO Convention. The
ESPOO Convention requires that nations that take action that will cause
transboundary environmental impacts assess those effects and provide
transparency and an opportunity for comment from citizens of both nations
161
impacted. In a transboundary context, it is often the host country that will
receive the benefits of a project, while environmental impacts are often more
concentrated on the other, non-project nation. Some have noted that the TEIA has
been widely adopted due to its lack of a hard, outcome-based limitation on
162
proposed actions. While impacts must be analyzed, and tradeoffs considered,
no mitigation actions are imposed by virtue of the assessment itself.
The ESPOO Convention explicitly states it is not to be used to require
163
transboundary assessments of marine activities. Instead, we can look to the fact
that the UNCLOS III itself articulated the environmental impact assessment
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164

concept in Article 203. Today, environmental impact assessment is proposed as
another way of integrating scientific information into project proposals to reduce
impacts on the marine environment. Although the process itself does not ensure
prevention of environmental harm, it does facilitate better decision making by
making explicit the tradeoffs of development and by requiring transparency,
which facilitates broad involvement by the public and non-governmental
organizations that can sometimes advocate strongly for mitigation of harms from
the proposed development project. Environmental impact assessments can
require that alternative sites are considered and can impose the responsibility to
consider the cumulative impacts from a specific project.
D. The Proposed Implementation Agreement
Professor Sprankling noted that technological advances allowing for resource
exploitation called for the international regulation of territories outside any one
165
nation. This advancement forms one part of the body of the international law of
property. As the pressures on oceans were mounting, the United Nations
convened an ad-hoc open-ended informal working group to consider measures to
166
address marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The working
group seeks to press momentum on an agreement to conserve the marine
biological resources of ABNJ. Among the recommendations is the development
of an international instrument under UNCLOS for the conservation and
167
sustainable use of marine biological diversity in ABNJ. As previously
discussed, parties have created an implementation agreement to address
overfishing—the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement—and created regional fisheries
organizations to attempt to prevent overfishing of highly migratory and
168
straddling stocks of fish. A similar agreement has not been reached to
implement more broad conservation measures for marine impacts. However, it is
possible to build on prior success, but garnering the political will to bring into
existence an agreement limiting impacts on the environment takes time, effort,
and leadership.
As the prior sections of this paper explored, there are many stressors on
marine environments, and the toolbox that has developed to address them is more
169
robust now. The proposed agreement would be built around the well164. UNCLOS, supra note 7, at art. 203.
165. SPRANKLING, supra note 2, at 3.
166. G.A. Res. 59/24, ¶ 73 (Feb. 4, 2005).
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the Sea of December 10, 1982, relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly
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established practices of marine spatial planning, environmental impact
170
assessment, and scientific information sharing. As outlined in the draft report of
the ad-hoc open ended informal working group studying potential conservation
of areas beyond national jurisdiction, “several delegations . . . expressed the view
that a global universal governance structure remained the best way to promote
171
sustainable marine biodiversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction.” On the
other hand, some delegations emphasized that existing legal instruments, as have
been discussed in this essay, exist, and focus should be on ensuring those binding
172
legal provisions are implemented. Further, the tools outlined—MSP, EIA, and
technology and data sharing—could be employed under the existing legal
provisions of UNCLOS III, ESPOO, and CBD. However, these international
agreements do not solve all the gaps, such as marine genetic resources in the
High Seas. A new agreement could bridge these gaps, although even through the
use of existing legal provisions it is apparent that international cooperation is
critical to addressing the transboundary impacts beleaguering the ocean
173
environment.
The successful implementation of a Marine Protected Area (MPA) network
through the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) illustrates a model that was built upon existing
174
legal authorities. OSPAR is a regional agreement. Efforts to create an MPA
were initially led by non-governmental organizations then championed by the
175
Netherlands and later Germany.
Those concerned about the health of the marine environment need to
generate the political will to put limits on consumption and destruction. It
requires that parties acknowledge the interrelated nature of ocean spaces and the
health of coastal ecosystems. It is ineffective to manage human impacts primarily
in the coastal zone and territorial seas. To some extent, the introduction of the
EEZ was a step toward expanding regulation beyond national territories without
completely closing the oceans to the peaceful uses of other coastal and noncoastal nations. But, the existing environmental regulations have been
insufficient from both the perspective of gaps and inability to proactively address
176
emerging issues. Sectoral regulation also allows for inefficiencies in a context
where enforcement at the minimum required level has been insufficient.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The international law of property has the potential to improve coordination of
ocean resource management. The declining status of biodiversity, fisheries, and
ecological health demands restorative projects and curtailment of pollution and
over-use. Legal scholars have identified the need for legal research to clarify
rights in the EEZ and ABNJ, for orderly development of marine renewables, to
reduce impacts of climate change, and to transition away from a fossil fuel
dominated economy. Marine biodiversity decline has the most severe impact on
island nations, whose economies depend on healthy oceans. As the working
group on conserving marine biodiversity noted, “accumulating and compounding
human impacts ha[ve] undermined the health of the oceans thereby gravely
177
threatening the well-being and livelihood of their populations.” As a practical
matter, nations should engage in the negotiation of a new High Seas Agreement
promoting the protection of biodiversity. We are perhaps on the cusp of such an
agreement, but need legal hooks to reel in political support, and the international
law of property could be one such hook. The grave concerns of overfishing and
protecting biodiversity animate the discussion about bringing stakeholders
together to share information and discuss the benefits of ocean resources. The ad
hoc, open-ended, informal working group studying issues relating to the
conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in ABNJ strongly
recommends the use of new tools to help overcome the challenge of fragmentary
management deficient in the employ of scientific information.
While the international community would benefit from an implementation
agreement that addresses High Seas management pursuant to UNCLOS III, we
are also in need of a new ethos of shared responsibility. The International Law of
Property may be influential in guiding that development as well. These are our
shared resources and our shared responsibilities. Historically, the drafters of
UNCLOS III recognized that the oceans must be managed with special attention
to its integrated functioning—the mindset of a supranational public trust imposed
on all nations could facilitate sustaining our common resources. The public trust
doctrine has many of the same features espoused by soft law instruments—
178
including the precautionary principle and intergenerational equity. When
engaging in ocean activities, all nations should take into account not only the
aspirations of their own citizens, but also responsibilities to other nations and our
future generations. The “common heritage of mankind” regime adopted for the
179
seabed minerals was a strong articulation of our shared destinies. Without
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integrated, science-based ocean management, it will not be possible to achieve
sustainable development and all nations—whether coastal or not—will be poorer.
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